















This paper analyzes the effects on Colombian manufacturing productivity of tax and 
foreign trade policy changes during the 1990s. Our results indicate that between 
1977 and 1999, aggregate manufacturing productivity largely stagnates and even 
declines in some of the larger industries. There is little entry and exit of plants or 
reallocation of labor. The productivity stagnation can be explained by this lack of 
liquidation  of  unproductive  plants  combined  with  slow  technological  advance. 
Dynamics vary significantly across sub-sectors, however, and our findings attribute 
this  variation  primarily  to  within-sector  output  reallocation.  The  importance  of 
industrial  policy  is  large.  Sector-level  productivity  declines  coincide  with 
protectionist policies in the form of import tariffs or beneficial tax treatments, while 
higher productivity levels are correlated with sectors’ increasing foreign exposure. 
Our finding of small productivity effects of preferential treatments further points to 
the  insignificant  role  played  by  output  reallocation  across  plants  in  stimulating 
productivity growth. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The 1990s have seen the liberalization of foreign trade in a large number of countries, 
including most Latin American countries. These liberalization  programs provide ideal 
settings  for  assessing  the  impact  of  such  policy  reforms  on  industry  productivity  to 
answer  the  question  of  whether  –  and  if  so  why  –  openness  to  trade  leads  to 
productivity growth.
1 The theoretical literature suggests several avenues through which 
trade liberalization may affect productivity. Increased access to imported materials and 
equipment may allow firms to raise efficiency through technological improvements. The 
removal of barriers to trade may furthermore increase product market competition due 
to  the  market  interaction  of  domestic  products  with  foreign  imports.  Increased 
competition could affect firms’ productivity in two ways. On the one hand, competition 
may spur firm innovation to enable domestic producers to compete on equal grounds 
with potentially higher-quality or cheaper imports. Increased competition could also lead 
to  a  reallocation  of  output  from  less  to  more  productive  firms  by  forcing  the  least 
productive firms to exit the industry. 
 
The first two channels lead to productivity growth by affecting technological change, in 
the  form  of  technological  progress,  learning  by  doing,  or  product  and  process 
innovation.  Technological  progress  raises  firm  productivity  indiscriminately  and, 
consequently, industry-level productivity increases. The last channel leads to industry-
level  productivity  increases  without  intra-firm  efficiency  increases,  but  through  a 
selection effect that allows more productive firms to survive and grow in open markets, 
while  the  less  productive  firms  contract.  Regardless  of  channel,  though,  not  only  is 
industry productivity affected, there are also potentially serious implications for factor 
markets. Industry productivity growth due to technological improvements across firms 
may lead to the partial displacement of labor within firms, in particular if growth arises 
from  skill-biased  or  labor-augmenting  technological  progress.  Productivity  growth 
                                                 
1 Work that studies the link between trade liberalization and productivity growth includes cross-country 
comparisons (Sachs and Warner 1995), sector-level studies such as Keller (2000) and Kim (2000), and 
plant-level analyses that will be discussed in greater detail below. For a review of the latter branch of the 
literature, see Tybout (2001). 3 
through exit of less productive firms entails the displacement of the entire workforce of 
the  exiting  plants.  Isolating  the  sources  of  productivity  growth  is  therefore  also  of 
importance in assessing the broader welfare effects of trade reforms. 
 
This paper analyzes the role of policy reforms in shaping industry productivity using the 
case of the Colombian manufacturing industry over the time period from 1977 to 1999. 
We  estimate  plant-level  total  factor  productivity  for  21  three-digit  manufacturing 
industries using the estimation framework suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2002).
2  We then provide empirical evidence about the role of 
industrial  policy  in  contributing  to  the  characterization  of  productivity  growth  in  the 
Colombian manufacturing sector.  
 
The sample period covers various policy regimes, including a tightening of foreign trade 
policies in the mid 1980s, followed by extensive trade liberalization in the early 1990s, 
which was partially reversed beginning in 1995. The data thus allows us to not only 
study  the  immediate  effect  of  trade  liberalization,  but  also  the  extent  to  which 
productivity  effects  are  sustained  in  the  face  of  reform  reversal.  In  recognizing  that 
exposure to foreign competition is but one aspect of firm competition that government 
policies affect, we depart from prior work in this area (among others, Pavcnik 2002, 
Fernandes 2002, and Muendler 2002) in assessing the effect of targeted tax cuts and 
other preferential tax treatments implemented during the later part of our data set on 
productivity evolution. The productivity effects of governmental tax reform packages are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, preferential tax treatments may stimulate investment or 
provide  protection  to  industries  that  are  susceptible  to  dynamic  learning-by-doing 
effects. On the other hand, to the extent that such policies reduce competition and the 
incentive to innovate, industry productivity may stagnate or fall if inefficient firms are 
sheltered from market forces.  
 
                                                 
2  Olley  and  Pakes  (1996)  examine  productivity  dynamics  in  the  U.S.  telecommunications  equipment 
industry  and  analyze  the  effect  of  deregulation  and  technological  change  on  productivity.  Based  on 
Chilean data, Levinsohn and Petrin (2002) investigate the role in Chilean productivity dynamics of intra-
firm productivity improvements relative to productivity gains caused by firm turnover. 4 
The empirical evidence on the importance of the various trade policy channels is mixed. 
A number of studies have pointed to the importance of foreign competition in generating 
intra-firm efficiency gains. In looking at the trade liberalization measures put in place in 
Chile during the late 1970s, Pavcnik (2002) finds significant productivity improvements 
in  import-competing  sectors  by  up  to  10.4%  in  response  to  liberalized  trade. 
Furthermore,  these  productivity  differentials  become  more  pronounced  over  time, 
suggesting persistent consequences for liberalization programs. Tybout and Westbrook 
(1995)  and  Muendler  (2002)  find  similarly  strong  effects  of  foreign  competition  on 
productivity  for  Mexico  during  1986  to  1990  and  Brazil  from  1986  to  1998.  Only 
Muendler finds that firm turnover significantly contributes to industry productivity gains in 
the  long  run  through  an  increased  likelihood  of  exit  by  less  efficient  plants.  Lopez-
Cordova (2003), a study of the productivity effects of NAFTA on Mexican manufacturing 
from 1993 to 2000, is a second example where plant turnover is found to significantly 
contribute  to  productivity  gains.  He  presents  evidence  that  suggests  that  increased 
investment exposure and reduced barriers to trade with the United States channel these 
productivity gains. 
 
The  Colombian  manufacturing  sector  is  the  subject  of  several  studies  using  earlier 
waves  of  the  plant-level  database  employed  in  this  paper.  Lui  and  Tybout  (1996) 
examine Colombian plant-level productivity during 1981 to 1989 and find that exiting 
plants are, on average, significantly less productive than incumbents. The productivity of 
an exiting plant furthermore deteriorates several years before the plant actually exits.  
 
Fernandes  (2002)  explores  whether  increased  exposure  to  foreign  competition 
generates gains in Colombian plant-level productivity for the period 1977 to 1991. She 
finds  a  strong,  negative  relationship  between  lagged  nominal  tariffs  and  plant 
productivity that is more pronounced for larger plants or those in more concentrated 
industries. Most of  the  important labor  market,  financial,  tax,  and  trade  reforms  that 
were undertaken by Colombia in recent years are unfortunately not covered by her data. 
 5 
The impact of the wide-ranging policy reforms of the 1990s on firm productivity and 
reallocation of output and inputs has, so far, received less attention. A series of papers 
by Kugler (1999) and Kugler and Kugler (2002) presents a notable exception. Based on 
a rich panel data set for the period 1982 to 96, the authors investigate the effect of both 
gradual  and  sudden  increases  in  pay-roll  taxation  during  the  sample  period  on  the 
composition of firms’ labor forces and wages. Their findings indicate that payroll taxes 
are only partially shifted to workers in the form of lower wages. We build on their work, 
but focus on different aspects of the Colombian policy reforms, namely the impact of 
foreign trade and tax reforms.  
 
Section II introduces the data, while section III summarizes the empirical methodology 
used to estimate productivity. Section IV summarizes the production function estimation 
results. Section V relates the estimated productivity measures to trade and tax reforms 
that went into effect during the sample period. Lastly, section VI concludes. Appendix A 




II.  Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
 
Our primary data source is the Annual Manufacturing Survey of Colombia (“Encuesta 
Annual Manufacturera,” henceforth EAM) collected by the Colombian Statistical Office 
DANE.
3 The available data from the Annual Manufacturing Survey extends from 1977 to 
1999. The survey represents a complete Census of the manufacturing sector, which 
accounts for approximately 15% of Colombian GDP. According to the EAM, the largest 
sectors, Textiles and Food Processing, together comprise 45% of manufacturing plants 
and employment. From 1977 to 1999, the manufacturing sector overall has doubled its 
real output; however, as measured in terms of either plant count or employment, it has 
grown in size only by approximately 18% implying significantly rising labor productivity. 
                                                 
3 DANE granted access to the data under an Inter-Institutional Cooperation Agreement between DANE 
and CEDE at the Universidad de los Andes. 6 
The later analysis investigates the sources of this output growth to determine whether it 
is driven by rising (total factor) productivity or simply by a reallocation of resources away 
from labor towards other inputs into production. 
 
The EAM has several limitations for empirical analyses. First, not all surveyed plants 
enter DANE’s official database. To be included in the official database, a manufacturing 
plant must report either an employment level at or above 10 employees or a production 
level  that  exceeds  a  cutoff  value  set  by  DANE.
4  This  selection  procedure  entails 
difficulties in defining plant entry and exit since the (dis-) appearance of a plant in the 
official  database  does  not  necessarily  correspond  to  the  formation  (liquidation)  of  a 
plant. For plants with close to 10 employees, entry and exit rates are thus likely to be 
overestimated. To correct for this possible overstatement of plant turnover, we use only 
those plants with a workforce of 15 or more employees in at least one of two adjacent 
years, either at time t or time t-1.  
 
A second shortcoming of the data’s value for panel analyses is caused by difficulties in 
uniquely identifying plants across survey years due to the introduction of a new plant 
identification method in 1992.
5 A large fraction  of plants have been traced manually 
across years. Table 1 illustrates, however, that the data continues to exhibit unnaturally 
large amounts of exit in 1991 paired with excess entry in 1992, introducing noise into 
the statistics for these two years. It presents a breakdown of the manufacturing sector 
into entering, exiting and continuing plants. Overall, the manufacturing sector remains 
relatively stable over time, with a high percentage of continuing plants each year. These 
plants hold more than 90% of total employment over the time period. After 1995, the 
number of exiting plants systematically exceeds the number of entrants; at the extreme 
is 1998 where only 263 entrants replace 649 exiting plants.  
 
                                                 
4 One exception to this selection rule has been in place since 1992 whereby all plants belonging to a 
multi-plant firm are included in the official database, regardless of size or production levels. 
5 In 1992 and again in 1993, the classification system that is used to assign plant identifiers and the rules 
by which a plant is included in the official database change significantly. These methodological changes 
make the tracking of each plant over time difficult. By manually tracing plants through the survey waves, 
most plants’ histories have been successfully identified, however. 7 
Table 2 further explores the characteristics of entrant and exiting plants in relation to 
incumbents. Entry  and  exit rates follow a pattern similar to that of overall economic 
activity, with higher entry and lower exit rates during periods of economic growth and 
the opposite during periods of economic slowdown. Average entry and exit rates over 
the period are very similar amounting to 9.1 and 9.2%, respectively. Measured both in 
terms of output and employment, entering and exiting plants are, on average, smaller 
than  incumbents,  however,  so  that  based  on  size  measures,  they  account  for 
significantly less than 9% of sector activity. Relative to incumbents, entrants contribute 
on average 2.7% of annual output and 4.2% of employment. Exiting firms contribute on 
average a similar proportion of output during the year before exit and represent only a 
slightly higher fraction of incumbent employment with 4.7%. 
 
The  final  data  set  consists  of  an  unbalanced  panel  of  12,084  manufacturing  plants 
amounting  to  97,346  plant-year  observations.  Only  926  plants  survive  from  the  first 
survey  in  1977  until  the  end  of  the  data  in  1999.  For  each  plant-year  observation, 
various additional plant characteristics, such as the plant’s manufacturing sub-sector, its 
incorporation status, and its age, are available in addition to input choices and output. 
Appendix A contains a more detailed description of the data set construction. 
 
 
III.  Productivity Estimation 
 
Since total factor productivity (TFP) is not directly observable, a variety of frameworks 
have been developed to infer a firm’s underlying productivity level from observable input 
and output data. The various ways of estimating total factor productivity as the residual 
in  the  production  function  differ  vastly  in  approach  and,  potentially,  outcome.  In  its 
simplest form, the production function can be estimated using OLS or panel fixed effects 
techniques. Since input choices are likely to be correlated with unobserved productivity, 
however,  a  simultaneity  bias  is  introduced  into  the  OLS  estimates  that  can  be 
addressed by using an instrumental variables estimator. In the case of plant-level data, 
valid  instruments  are  scarce.  As  an  alternative  to  instrumental  variables,  the  recent 8 
literature has put forth semi-parametric estimation techniques that rely directly on the 
dynamic nature of the underlying plant decision problem, which drives revealed input 
and  output outcomes. The  estimation procedure employed in this paper  applies this 
framework suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2002) in 
estimating the production function coefficients and subsequently deriving estimates of 
the underlying TFP series. As a comparison, we also present results from alternative 
estimation  procedures.  We  begin  with  a  brief  summary  of  the  main  estimation 
framework. 
 
We  assume  that  the  industry  produces  a  homogeneous  product  with  Cobb-Douglas 
technology  and  that  the  factors  underlying  profitability  differences  among  plants  are 
Hicks-neutral efficiency differences. The plant’s decision problem is one of intertemporal 
profit maximization where profits depend on the plant’s state variables, here the capital 
stock Kt and the plant’s productivity wt; prices; and the plant’s input choices. Output is 
thus determined according to the following logarithmic production function: 
 
t t t
t t m t e t l t k t
u
u m e l k y
e w
b b b b b
+ =
+ + + + + = 0
  1 
 
where yt denotes the log of output, kt represents the log of capital, lt is the log of the 
number of employees, et is the log of electric energy consumption, and mt denotes the 
log  of  intermediate  input  consumption.  The  econometric  error,  ut,  accounts  for 
differences  between  predicted  and  actual  production  levels.  It  consists  of  two 
components, the unobserved productivity index wt and a mean-zero error et representing 
measurement error or unexpected productivity shocks.  
 
The plant’s inter-temporal maximization problem yields demand functions for investment 
and intermediate inputs as a function of unobserved productivity.
6 The innovation of this 
approach lies in using either of these demand functions as a proxy for wt in the plant’s 
                                                 
6  See  Olley  and  Pakes  (1996)  and  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2002)  for  more  detail  on  the  dynamic 
maximization problem. 9 
production  function.  We  follow  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2002)  in  working  with  the 
intermediate input demand function, 
 
. , ( ) = t t t t k m m w   2 
 
For positive intermediate input choices, the intermediate input demand function can be 
inverted to yield:
7 
) , ( t t t t k m g = w  
and 
t t t t t m t e t l t k t k m g m e l k y e b b b b b + + + + + + = ) , ( 0   3 
 
The economic intuition behind the intermediate input demand function and its inversion, 
equations  2  and  3,  is  the  following. Consider a  plant  with  a  high productivity  in the 
current period. For price-taking plants, a higher level of productivity implies a higher 
marginal  product  of  capital.  In  response,  the  plant  produces  more  output  until  the 
marginal product of capital falls to the point where it again equals its rental rate. To 
increase  output,  the  plant  increases  all  inputs  including  intermediate  inputs.  A  high 
intermediate input usage thus reveals a more productive plant. 
 
If the functional form of gt were known, the coefficients could be estimated via OLS. 
Instead, estimation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, consistent estimates for the 
variable input coefficients are derived from the partially linear model in equation 3. We 
initially estimate the conditional expectations  ] , | [ E t t t m k y ,  ] , | [ E t t t m k l , and  ] , | [ E t t t m k e . 
Subtracting these expected output and variable input measures from equation 3 results 
in: 
 
t t t t t e t t t t l t t t t m k e e m k l l m k y y e b b + - + - = - ]) , | [ E ( ]) , | [ E ( ] , | [ E   4 
 
                                                 
7  The  main  empirical  advantage  of  using  intermediate  inputs  rather  than  investment  as  a  proxy  for 
productivity is that most plants consume positive amounts of intermediate inputs, whereas a large fraction 
of the plants in our data does not make strictly positive investment choices. 10 
Estimating equation 4 via OLS yields consistent estimates of bl and be.
8 
 
In the second step, the estimated  variable  input  coefficients are  substituted  into the 
production function, 
 
t t t t t m t k t e t l t m k e l y e x w w b b b b + = - - - - - - ] | [ E ˆ ˆ
1 ,   5 
 
assuming that wt evolves according to a first-order Markov process,  t t t t x w w w + = - ] | [ E 1 , 
with  a  mean-zero  innovation  xt.  The  components  of  the  conditional  expectation 
] | [ E 1 - t t w w , which equals  ] | [ E 1 - + t t t w e w , can be approximated by:
 
t m t k t e t l t t t m k e l y b b b b e w - - - - = + ˆ ˆ  
and 
1 1 1 1 1 1 ) , ( ˆ
- - - - - - - - = t m t k t t t t m k k m b b f w .
9  6 
 
The  function  ) , ( ˆ
1 1 1 - - - t t t k m f   equals  ] , | ˆ ˆ [ E 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - - - - t t t e t l t m k e l y b b .  It  is  estimated 
separately in the first step for the two time periods 1977-91 and 1992-99 to account for 
the exogenous variation in the capital series brought about by methodological changes 
in the EAM in 1992 (see discussion below) and to acknowledge structural changes in 
the economy that may have affected the performance of the manufacturing sector. 
 
Finally, equation 5 is estimated via Generalized Method of Moments, using as moment 
conditions the requirements that  0 ) | ( E = + t t t k e x  and  0 ) | ( E 1 = + - t t t m e x . The moment 
conditions rely on xt being mean-independent of variables known at the beginning of the 
period, that is the capital stock, kt, and the choice of intermediate inputs in the previous 
                                                 





9 An estimate of  ] | [ E 1 - t t w w  can then be derived by regressing  t t e w +  on w t-1. 11 
period,  mt-1.
10  Estimates  of  bk  and  bm  are  obtained  by  minimizing  the  GMM  criterion 
function Q( k b , m b ): 
 
( ) ( ) ) ˆ ( ) ˆ (     )     (       ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( min ) ˆ (
1
ˆ b e b x b e b x b
b
+ S + =
- Z' Z Z' Z ' Q   7 
 
where the error vectors  ) ˆ (b x  and  ) ˆ (b e  are stacked over plant and year observations 
from the second to the last year in which a plant is observed in the data, Z denotes the 
instrument matrix of lagged intermediate inputs and current period capital values, and 
S is the estimated variance-covariance matrix of  )) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ( b e b x + . 
 
IV.  Estimation Results 
 
We estimate production function parameters at the three-digit ISIC level to analyze as 
homogenous a sample of producers as possible given that the underlying theoretical 
model applies to homogeneous product industries. The unit of observation is a plant-
year combination. We use the plant’s annual value of production measured in millions of 
peso as our output variable.
11 Inputs into production are specified to be the plant’s total 
number  of  employees,  its  annual  electric  energy  consumption  measured  in  kilowatt, 
total annual expenditures on raw materials measured in millions of peso, and the plant’s 
capital stock in millions of peso. The EAM explicitly asks each plant to report the market 
value of its capital stock, allowing us to circumvent the perpetual inventory method or 
related  approaches  to  construct  plant-level  capital  stocks.  We  correct  the  reported 
capital stock measures for inflation adjustments that are added to each plant’s capital 
stock beginning in  1994.
12 Nominal variables in current peso  are  converted to  1999 
                                                 




m  by estimating the production function via OLS, substituting the 
consistently  estimated  first-stage  estimates  for 
￿
l  and 
￿
e  .  Throughout  the  estimation  routine,  all 
conditional expectations are estimated via locally weighted least squares. Levinsohn and Petrin (2002) 
contains a step-by-step outline of the estimation. 
11 We follow the literature in estimating an output-based production function instead of its value-added 
counterpart since using value added as the measure of the plant’s production imposes the separability of 
intermediate inputs from total production. 
12 The methodological changes introduced to the EAM in 1992 and 1993 affect the reported capital series 
in  other  dimensions  as  well.  From  1994  onwards,  a  plant’s  reported  capital  stock  includes  inflation 12 
peso  using  corresponding  price  deflators.  Appendix  A  contains  a  more  detailed 
definition of individual variables. 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in estimation, aggregated to 
the two-digit ISIC sector level. The largest sectors in terms of number of plants are the 
Food  Processing,  Textiles,  and  Machinery  sectors.  Inputs  and  output  differ 
systematically across sectors, justifying the division of the sample into sector-level sub-
samples during estimation. Food Processing, for example, continues to be among the 
largest  sectors  in  terms  of  average  annual  output  and  employment,  similar  to  the 
Chemicals sector that, however, exhibits a less skewed distribution of average plant 
employment  at  higher  employment  levels.  Sectors  differ  most  significantly  in  their 
energy consumption ranging from energy-intensive sectors such as the Basic Metals 
sector to labor-intensive sectors such as Textiles and Leather. Across inputs, median 
input consumption falls short of mean input levels, indicating the presence of a large 
number of smaller plants operating in sectors with fewer large plants.  
 
Table  4  contains  the  parameter  estimates  for  the  two-stage  estimation  procedure 
outlined above using material inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity. Coefficients 
are precisely estimated at standard levels of statistical significance with the exception of 
the  capital  coefficient  that  is  frequently  insignificant  under  the  Levinsohn-and-Petrin 
estimator. The insignificance of the capital coefficient may be due to artificial variation in 
the capital series introduced by the methodological changes in the EAM after 1992.
13 
 
Across  industries  there  is  significant  variation  in  the  partial  elasticity  of  output  with 
respect to each of the inputs. The average output elasticity with respect to labor equals 
0.30, with respect to energy consumption 0.08, with respect to materials 0.55, and with 
                                                                                                                                                             
adjustments and investment is recorded at book value to more closely reflect accounting standards of 
investment rather than representing actual investment outlays. The EAM does not retain the difference 
between book and market values as a separate variable and we consequently cannot adjust for it in the 
empirical analysis. Applying the perpetual inventory  method to the capital stock beginning in 1994 is 
infeasible since it frequently yields negative values for the capital stock. 
13 Note that we acknowledge the structural change in the capital series in the first stage of the estimation 
procedure by allowing for a break in the estimated residual output contribution of capital and materials in 
1992. This may not be sufficient, however, to fully remove all artificial capital fluctuations. 13 
respect to capital 0.08. In comparison to the average share of capital in total production 
cost depicted in Table 4,
14 the estimated capital coefficients are thus low. They are in 
line,  however,  with  production  function  estimates  found  in  Fernandes  (2002)  who 
studies Colombian productivity over the period 1977-1991. Similar to our results, she 
finds capital coefficients ranging from 0.03 to 0.11 using OLS and from 0.01 to 0.13 
using  the  Levinsohn-and-Petrin  estimator.  The  most  variation  in  elasticities  across 
sectors occurs for materials, as measured by the standard deviation normalized by the 
mean of the input’s estimated elasticity across sectors. 
 
To justify the use of raw material expenditures as a proxy for unobserved productivity w, 
we verify that the estimated productivity series,  w ˆ , satisfies the properties of a valid 
proxy  assumed  by  the  underlying  economic  model.  In  particular,  the  plant’s  inter-
temporal profit maximization problem yields a monotone policy function with productivity 
being  increasing  in  the  materials  proxy  for  a  given  level  of  the  capital  stock.  This 
property holds across sectors for the empirical relationship between plant-level w and 
raw material expenditures. In 18 out of the 21 sectors, a regression of w ˆ  on m and k 
indicates  on  average  a  positive  relationship  between  productivity  and  raw  materials 




Table  4  furthermore  compares  the  production  function  coefficients  generated  by  the 
nonparametric  estimator  to  those  obtained  from  alternative  production  function 
estimation methods. We estimate sector-level production functions using ordinary least 
squares and plant-level fixed effects. Both regressions include an indicator variable to 
control for the structural break in the capital series after 1992. The results allow us to 
investigate the extent to which simultaneity present in plants’ input choices affects the 
                                                 
14 The input shares shown in Table 4 represent average cost shares for the period 1981-’93 since DANE 
collected electricity expenditures (as opposed to electricity usage in kilowatt) for this smaller sub-sample 
of the data only. The cost shares may therefore not accurately reflect average input shares for the full 
sample.  
15 The relationship does not hold for the Tobacco, Petroleum, and Transport Equipment sectors. 
16  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2002)  suggest  further  specification  tests  of  the  intermediate  input  proxy  for 
productivity. 14 
production  function  parameters  under  traditional  estimation  methods.  Simultaneity 
biases  may  arise  if  plants’  input  choices  are  responsive  to  unobserved  productivity 
shocks. Andrews and Marschak (1944) suggest that simultaneity biases may be most 
severe  for  inputs  that  adjust  rapidly.  Under  OLS,  estimates  of  the  coefficients  on 
variable inputs are then likely to be biased upwards. If capital as a quasi-fixed input is 
uncorrelated or only weakly correlated with the unobserved productivity shock, the OLS 
estimate  of  the  capital  coefficient  is  furthermore  likely  to  be  biased  downward.  The 
estimated variable-input coefficients are largely consistent with this intuition. The OLS 
coefficient exceeds its semi-parametric counterpart in 16 out of 21 sectors for labor, in 
17 out of 21 sectors for energy, and in 13 out of 21 sectors for material inputs. The OLS 
estimate of the capital coefficient, however, is smaller than the Levinsohn-and-Petrin 
estimate in only 8 out of 21 sectors. This is not surprising in light of the imprecisely 
estimated capital coefficient using the Levinsohn-and-Petrin estimator. Future work will 
compare the distributions of the capital coefficient under the two estimators in more 
detail,  using  bootstrapping  techniques  to  generate  an  empirical  distribution  for  the 
capital coefficient.  
 
Given production function estimates, a measure of total factor productivity at the plant 
level can be inferred as 
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Annual sector-level productivity  t P F T ˆ  can then be constructed as a weighted average of 
each plant’s productivity measure, using output shares as weights. Table 5 summarizes 
the  manufacturing  sector  productivity  index  derived  from  the  Levinsohn-and-Petrin 
estimation  methodology.  The  first  column  contains  an  output-weighted  average  of 
productivity  aggregated  across  industries  that  is  normalized  to  one  in  1977. 
Normalization  allows  us  to  more  clearly  track  the  path  followed  by  productivity  with 
respect to a fixed point in time and across sectors.  
 15 
During the twenty-year period of our sample, manufacturing productivity has remained 
fairly stable. The early 1980s see a fall in productivity relative to 1977, which is reversed 
during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, the period of wide-ranging foreign 
trade reforms. By the end of the 1990s, however, productivity returns to its earlier levels, 
possibly caused by the economic slowdown during that period. By the end of the data 
set in 1999, aggregate manufacturing productivity has fallen below its 1977 level. 
 
This  pattern  holds  for  both  output-weighted  average  productivity  and  un-weighted 
average productivity displayed in the table’s second column. Un-weighted productivity is 
smaller  than  output-weighted  productivity,  indicating  the  higher  productivity  of  larger 
plants. In general, the productivity distribution is highly skewed as shown by a below-
average median productivity and a large standard deviation. Changes in un-weighted 
average  productivity  reflect  primarily  the  effect  of  technological  change.  Relative  to 
1977,  un-weighted  average  productivity  declines  more  steeply  than  output-weighted 
productivity  and  fails  to  return  to  its  1977  level  throughout  the  sample  period. 
Productivity  stagnation  arises  therefore  in  part  from  a  slow-down  of  technological 
change.   
 
Last, Table 5 compares the evolution of total factor productivity to real labor productivity. 
Labor  productivity  increases  dramatically  and  continuously  over  the  entire  sample 
period. By 1999, it has increased by 71.1% relative to 1977. A significant fraction of the 
gains in labor productivity arise during the economic slow-down of the 1990s, a period 
of shrinking employment, but constant or slowly increasing output. The starkly different 
picture that results from the TFP measures suggests a substitution away from labor to 
other  inputs  allowing  output  and  TFP  to  remain  virtually  unchanged,  while  labor 
productivity increases.  
 
A  breakdown  of  productivity  levels  by  two-digit  ISIC  industry  reveals  more  nuanced 
productivity dynamics across manufacturing industries. Figure 1 depicts 2-digit sector 
level productivity growth rates obtained from the three alternative productivity estimation 
methods  in  Table  4,  as  well  as  labor  productivity.  The  figure  illustrates  that  across 16 
sectors,  annual  productivity  growth  rates  fluctuate  significantly.
17  The  productivity 
growth paths derived from OLS are very similar to those based on the Levinsohn-and-
Petrin estimator. The correlation between the two growth series ranges from 0.91 to 
0.99  across  sectors.  In  contrast,  the  labor  productivity  growth  paths  differ  most 
significantly from the TFP-based productivity growth series. The correlation coefficient 
between the labor productivity growth series and the Levinsohn-and-Petrin TFP growth 
series,  for  example,  ranges  from  0.23  to  0.66  in  the  2-digit  sectors,  and  similar 
correlation coefficient ranges obtain when comparing labor productivity to OLS-based 
and fixed effects-based total factor productivity.
18  
 
To  understand  differences  in  productivity  dynamics  across  sectors,  we  decompose 
productivity  changes  following  Foster,  Haltiwanger,  and  Krizan  (2001)  into  the 
contribution of continuing, entering, and exiting plants: 
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The first or within term measures the contribution to total productivity change of within  
plant productivity changes, weighted by the plant’s output share of the previous year, 
qi,t-1. 
                                                 
17 We find that high variations in the pattern followed by the productivity indices of some sectors often 
respond to the atypical behavior of a single large plant in a specific year. This is true in particular for the 
Textiles sector. While this may be due to misreported information, we have chosen to keep such plants in 
the database unless the data error is completely evident.   
18  Syverson  (2001)  points  out  that  productivity  measures  may  be  biased  if  the  production  function 
estimation  does  not account for the  possibility  of  demand  shocks that  induce  cross-plant  variation  in 
investment  or  materials  demand.  These  would  manifest  themselves  in  significant  dispersion  in  the 
productivity residuals even for homogeneous sectors. To gauge the size of the potential  bias due to 
unexplained demand variation, we compare the observed residual dispersion across industries that vary 
in the degree of heterogeneity of their products, using one of the internally less homogeneous 2-digit 
sectors, the Food Processing sector, as a case study.  We derive TFP estimates for each of the 4-digit 
industries based on separate estimations and compare the resulting dispersion in productivity residuals 
across industries. On average, more heterogeneous industries display higher degrees of dispersion in 
TFP than homogeneous food industries. These dispersion statistics are more consistent with differing 
degrees  of  product  differentiation  across  industries  than  with  the  presence  of  plant-specific  demand 
variation,  alleviating  some  of  the  concerns  about  potential  biases  in  the  TFP  measures.  Results  are 
available from the authors upon request. 17 
The between plant component of productivity changes captures changing output shares 
of firms, weighted by the deviation of plant productivity from industry productivity. An 
increase in a plant’s output share will thus only contribute positively to the industry’s 
overall productivity evolution if the plant’s productivity exceeds the industry average. 
The  third term  measures  the  covariance  between  plants’  output  share  changes  and 
productivity changes. The final components of the decomposition are the productivity 
contributions of entering and exiting plants. 
 
Table 6 contains the results of the above decomposition for the manufacturing sector as 
a  whole  as  well  as  for  2-digit  industries,  broken  into  sub-periods.  The  sub-periods 
correspond to the regime of high trade protection from 1977 to 1984, followed by a 
prolonged period of liberalization from 1985 to 1995 that accelerates during the early 
1990s, and finally a partial reversal of reforms from 1996 to 1999. Across sectors, the 
initial period is marked by negative or very small positive annual growth rates, with the 
exception of the Glass sector, the only sector that displays sustained productivity growth 
throughout the sample period. The period of policy reforms is, on average, associated 
with  positive  growth  rates,  in  particular  for  the  Textiles,  Paper,  Basic  Metals,  and 
Machinery  sectors.  Finally,  the  most  recent  experience  of  the  manufacturing  sector 
indicates a renewed drop in productivity growth rates, frequently to negative levels. This 
trend is particularly strong in the Textiles and Machinery sectors, whereas the Wood, 
Chemicals and Glass sectors experience only a slight fall in annual productivity growth 
rates. Averaged over the period, the Textiles, Glass, and Basic Metals sectors exhibit 
large, positive growth rates, while in particular the productivity of the Food Processing 
sector shrinks steadily.  
 
The productivity decomposition indicates that at the aggregate level, the evolution of 
productivity  derives  primarily  from  a continued  erosion  of  within-plant productivity  by 
continuing firms, indicating a lack of technological advance at the plant level. Both the 
within  and  between  components  of  productivity  change  are  negative  for  the 
manufacturing sector as a whole, while the covariance between productivity and output 
changes is positive indicating that the drop in within-plant productivity is countered by 18 
the  reallocation  of  resources  and  output  to  more  productive  plants.  Relative  to  the 
contributions to productivity growth by continuing plants, the effect of entry and exit on 
overall  productivity  growth  is  quite  significant,  in  particular  during  the  early  and  late 
periods of tighter international trade policy.  
 
A  significant  fraction  of  the  overall  entry  and  exit  contributions  is  attributable  to  the 
behavior of the Food Processing sector, one of the largest manufacturing sectors. The 
continued negative growth experienced by the Food Processing sector arises due to the 
exit  of  plants  that  contribute  positively  to  the  evolution  of  productivity,  while  less 
productive  plants  enter.  The  experience  of  the  Food  Processing  sector  is  unusual, 
however, and the following section analyzes the degree to which it can be explained by 
preferential tax treatments in place for the sector.  
 
 
V.  The Effect of Preferential Treatments on Productivity 
 
V.1.  Preferential Treatments through Tariffs and Tax Benefits in Colombia, 1979-1999 
 
V.1.1  Protection through Tariffs 
 
Prior to 1990, Colombian trade policy is directed at protecting the economy to promote 
growth through import substitution and to diversify exports away from primary goods. 
Import quotas in particular drive up domestic prices during this period. Both the implicit 
tariff levied on imports (the implicit import cost in the form of security deposits with the 
Colombian  Central  Bank)  and  price  levels  in  heavily  protected  sectors  peak  in  the 
beginning of the 1970s and again in the second half of the 1980s. Subsequent dramatic 
trade  liberalization  measures  in  the  early  1990s  cause  import  restrictions  at  the 
aggregate manufacturing sector level to fall to their lowest values over the last 25 years. 
 
The  liberalization  of  the  early  1990s  does  not,  however,  apply  uniformly  to  all 
manufacturing  sectors.  Table  7  compares  average  effectively  paid  tariff  rates  at  the 19 
three-digit ISIC level in the pre-1990 period to the equivalent measure during the post-
1990 period of liberalization. The tariff rates are constructed from three-digit ISIC level 
data  obtained  from  DANE  on  the  monetary  value  of imports  and  the  corresponding 
effective tariff payments for the sample period from 1977 to 1999. Tariff rates averaged 
across sectors fall by 8.6 percentage points from an average of 18.7% over the period 
1977-89  to  on  average  10.2%  over  the  period  1990-99.  Some  of  the  more  heavily 
protected industries include the Glass and Machinery sectors (two-digit ISIC sectors 36 
and 38 respectively) with a majority of three-digit ISIC sub-sector tariff rates exceeding 
25%  between  1977-89.  The  Machinery  sector  subsequently  experiences  one  of  the 
highest degrees of liberalization with a decrease in tariff rates within the sector of on 
average 60.7%.  
 
Figure 2 displays the time series of tariff rates aggregated to the two-digit ISIC level. 
The  figure  underlines  the  stark  decline  in  tariff  rates  in  the  early  1990s.  It  also 
emphasizes, however, that for a number of sectors, the significant tariff reduction of the 
early 1990s is later reversed through renewed tariff rate hikes. In most cases, however, 
tariff rates do not return to their pre-1990 levels by 1999. 
 
 
V.1.2  Tax Benefits 
 
The Colombian tax structure includes a significant number of exceptions for specific 
plants and industries, such as tax exemptions, discounts, and deductions, which not 
only make the tax system complex and administratively burdensome, but also lead to 
the erosion of important sources of fiscal income.
19 Despite efforts towards expanding 
the Colombian taxable base over the last two decades, it remains a small proportion of 
GDP compared to other Latin American countries.
20 
 
                                                 
19 In 1999, exemptions amounted to approximately ten percentage points of Colombian GDP. 
20 A 1994 IMF study of 20 countries found, for instance, that Colombia had the least value-added tax 
coverage as a percent of GDP of 33%, compared to an average of 50% for the entire sample.  20 
The  adoption  of  exceptions  to  the  tax  code  has  been  justified  as  a  corrective 
mechanism  to  reduce  market  imperfections.  A  tax  exemption  may  be  beneficial,  for 
example, if it renders the tax structure more equal or if it promotes (discourages) the 
production of goods with positive (negative) externalities. Similarly, in industries that rely 
heavily  on  learning-by-doing,  an  infant-industry  argument  would  suggest  that  tax 
shelters or protectionist policies more generally have positive long-run implications for 
sector productivity. The Colombian government in particular has used tax instruments 
as development tools for specific sectors or to promote social and regional equality. 
These potential benefits have to be weighed against efficiency losses that may result 
from  such  fiscal  instruments.  Exceptions  to  the  tax  code  may,  for  example,  distort 
investments that would have taken place in their absence or induce firms to attempt to 
qualify  for  them  at  all  cost,  even  if  they  are  not  among  the  original  benefactors. 
Evidence shows that the fiscal cost of tax exemptions is often greater than the direct 
benefits they generate. Empirically it is difficult, however, to quantify the level of rent 
transfers, in particular because lobbying pressures play a significant role in instigating 
tax exemptions in addition to efficiency and welfare concerns.
21 
 
To assess the extent of exemptions at the sector-level, we build a tax benefit measure 
in the form of an effectively paid tax rate based on data from the Colombian Ministry of 
Finance that is available for the 1993-99 sub-period of our sample. A firm’s income tax 
burden can decrease either due to exemptions that reduce the firm’s taxable income 
directly or due to explicit reductions in the income tax payable. Combining these two 
measures, an estimate of a firm’s effectively paid income tax can be calculated as: 
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21 For a detailed comparison of Latin American tax policy reforms, see Bird (1992) and Bird and Chen 
(1999). Soto and Steiner (1999) provide an excellent comparison of the numerous Colombian tax reforms 
of the last two decades, while Hernandez, Prada, Ramirez, and Soto (2000) quantify the fiscal costs of 
the tax exemptions in place as of 2000. Table 8 summarizes the recent Colombian tax history from 1979 
to 1999, including tax exemptions and benefits, as well as foreign trade taxes. 21 
Here,  effective t  denotes the effectively paid tax rate and TB is the taxable income base. 
effective t  is computed as the product of  tax pre- a , the rate of reduction of pre-tax income due 
to  exemptions,    tax a ,  the  rate  of  reduction  of  the  nominal  income  tax  rate,  and  the 
nominal tax rate  nominal t . The tax data provided by the Colombian Ministry of Finance 
allows us to calculate both  tax pre- a  and    tax a  at the four-digit ISIC level. Table 9 presents 
pre-tax  exemption  rates,  tax pre- a ,  and  effectively  paid  income  tax  rates,  effective t , 
aggregated to the three-digit ISIC manufacturing sector over the period 1993-1999.  
 
While the nominal tax rate is set uniformly across all sectors at an average of 32.9% 
over the period, the effective income tax rate paid by the manufacturing sector amounts 
to only 27.5%. On average,  tax pre- a  equals 4.5%, but the variance in exemption rates is 
large. For instance, the average exemption rate for the Printed Materials sector is close 
to  44%.  The  Food  Products,  Beverages  and  Other  Non-Metallic  Mineral  Products 
sectors follow with average exemption rates of 9%, while some sectors like Leather 
Products  receive  no  exemptions  at  all  to  reduce  their  taxable  base.  The  overall 
monetary  value  of  tax  exemptions  to  the  manufacturing  sector  amounts  to 
approximately $259.4 million in 1999. Table 10 shows how these benefits have been 
distributed rather unevenly across sectors over time, with the Food Processing, Printed 
Materials and Chemicals sectors together capturing in excess of 55% of all benefits 
each year. All three of these sectors experienced negative average annual productivity 
growth during our sample period.  
 
The producers’ response to tax incentives is difficult to isolate, mainly because the role 
that tax incentives play in inducing investment cannot be easily separated from other 
determinants  of  firm  investment  decisions.  Instead  of  focusing  on  the  investment 
response,  we  therefore  concentrate  on  the  link  between  productivity  growth  and 
preferential tax treatments.  
 
 22 
V.2.  Policy Exercise 
 
To  provide  evidence  of  the  extent  to  which  the  evolution  of  sector-level  preferential 
treatments, both in the form of protection from foreign competition and tax exemptions, 
has contributed to systematic changes in productivity within and across industries, we 
relate the estimated productivity to measures of tax and foreign policy. The setting is 
ideal  for  studying  whether  openness  to  trade  induces  productivity  growth  since  the 
available data covers both the ten years before and after the largest Colombian trade 
liberalization in the early 1990s. The sample period furthermore covers a series of tax 
reforms that lead to significant variation, both within the cross-section and over time, in 
the available tax policy instruments. According to Bird and Chen (1999), fiscal needs 
and the pressures of strong lobbying groups drive most of the Colombian tax reforms 
during the sample period. The data allows us to investigate whether these tax policies 
have nevertheless provided microeconomic incentives that help to sustain productivity 
levels. 
 
As measures of protection from foreign competition, we use the effectively paid tariff 
rates at the three-digit ISIC sector level discussed above. Ideally, a measure of effective 
protection  would be preferable. Building such a measure,  however, requires specific 
knowledge of the imported component of inputs at the sector-level. This data is currently 
not available. We assume furthermore that the trends in effectively paid tariff rates are 
representative of other trade policy instruments that affect a sector’s protection from 
foreign competition, such as quotas.  
 
To further control for the impact of foreign trade on productivity we construct a foreign 
markets’ exposure measure and the rate of real devaluation at the sector-level. The 
foreign markets’ exposure measure is defined as the ratio of one half of the sum of 
imports and exports to output. The sector-level real devaluation rate is constructed for 
two-digit ISIC industries, using data on the nominal Peso-Dollar exchange rate from the 
Central Bank of Colombia and sector-level inflation rates for both Colombia and the US, 
based on producer price indexes for the period 1990-1999 for Colombia and 1982-1999 23 
for the US and manufacturing-sector producer price index for the earlier years.
22 The 
data were obtained from the Colombian Central Bank and the U.S. Department of Labor 
Statistics.  
 
To measure preferential tax treatments across sectors, we use the difference between 
the nominal tax rate  nominal t  and the estimated effectively paid tax rate,  effective t . A larger 
value for the difference,  ) ( effective nominal t t - , corresponds to a larger tax benefit received by 
the particular manufacturing sector.  
 
We estimate a series of panel regression models at the plant level of the following form: 
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Here,  w ˆ   denotes  the  (log)  plant-level  unobserved  productivity  resulting  from  our 
estimation in section III. ET is the lagged 3-digit sector-level effectively paid tariff rate, 
DEV  denotes  the  lagged  2-digit  sector-level  real  devaluation  rate  of  the  Colombian 
peso, and EXP the above described, 3-digit sector-level measure of exposure to foreign 
markets. The policy variables are interacted with three size-class indicators s to account 
for differential impacts across plant sizes.
23 We also include size dummies explicitly in 
the panel estimation.  
 
Since the tax data is only available for the period 1993-99, we estimate four separate 
panel  regressions.  First,  we  estimate  the  relationship  between  log  productivity  and 
foreign  trade  measures  only  for  the  full  period  1978-99.  In  addition  to  the  above 
variables, we include a dummy variable that is set to one for all years subsequent to the 
1990 regime shift in trade policy. The second and third regressions break the panel into 
                                                 
22 We use real devaluation instead of the real exchange rate because data for the latter is unavailable at 
the sector level. 
23 The small-size dummy equals one if plant employment is less than 50. A medium-sized plant has 
employment larger than or equal to 50 and less than 200. The large-size dummy equals one if plant 
employment is greater than or equal than 200. 24 
two periods, 1977-92 and 1993-99, to check the robustness of the results in comparison 
to the final regression for the period 1993-99 that includes the tax benefit measures. 
The sub-period regressions also allow us to increase our understanding about policy-
induced productivity response patterns during the 1990s. 
 
All panel models include plant-level fixed effects to control for individual plant drivers of 
efficiency and to reduce potential endogeneity between the policy measures and the 
average sector productivity levels. Finally, all panels include year dummies to account 
for  exogenous  macroeconomic  shocks  that  may  have  affected  manufacturing 
productivity. Since the policy variables are only at the sector level, standard errors are 
corrected for clustering at the four-digit ISIC level, the lowest level of disaggregation 
among the policy variables. Table 11 presents the estimation results. 
 
The results indicate that the response patterns of plant productivity differ across time 
periods. Prior to the liberalization of the 1990s, higher devaluation rates are associated 
with  higher  plant  level  productivity.  Devaluation  may  serve  the  purpose  of  making 
domestic products more competitive in the US market and thereby boosting productivity 
through exports. This result, consistent with productivity growth from learning-by-doing, 
is  unexpectedly  true  for  all  plant  sizes  after  controlling  for  exposure  to  foreign 
competition. Higher exposure to foreign competition has, as expected, a positive and 
statistically  significant  effect  on  productivity  across  regression  models,  higher  in 
magnitude  for  the  period  1993-99.  The  response  to  sector-level  devaluation  is  very 
different for the later sub-period where the estimated effect of sector-level devaluation is 
negative  for  all  plant  sizes.  Across  the  three  sub-period  panel  models,  a Wald  test 
cannot reject that the devaluation effects are the same across plant sizes suggesting 




                                                 
24 1978-92: F-statistic = 0.22 and Pr(F > F(2, 40626)) = 0.81; 1994-99 (1): F-statistic = 0.29 and Pr(F > 
F(2, 19065)) = 0.75; 1994-99 (2): F-statistic = 0.20 and Pr(F > F(2, 19062)) = 0.82. 25 
The response in productivity to lagged effective tariff rates also changes across periods. 
In  general,  plants  in  industries  with  higher  effective  tariff  protection  exhibit  lower 
productivity. In the pre-1990 period, however, the effect is statistically insignificant for 
large  plants.
25  In  the  two  regressions  for  the  sub-period  1993-99,  the  estimated 
coefficients  on  effective  tariff  rates  are  larger  in  absolute  value  and  statistically 
significant, indicating a negative relationship between productivity and tariff protection 
for all plant sizes. These differences in coefficients across time periods translate into 
sizable differences in the elasticity of productivity with respect to tariff rates. At mean 
tariff levels for the manufacturing sector of 15.2% for the period 1977-92, the estimated 
coefficients translate into productivity responses of -0.30%, -2.3%, and -1.72% to a 1% 
increase in tariff rates for large, medium, and small plants, respectively.
26 For the period 
1993-99 with mean tariff rates of only 7.9%, however, a 1% increase in tariff rates from 
the mean would imply a decrease in productivity by 3.0%, 4.3%, and 4.5% for plants of 
the three size classes, respectively. The Wald test indicates that the coefficients are not 
statistically different across sizes for the later sub-period.
27 
 
The small-size dummy variable has a negative coefficient in all panels that is significant 
in  particular  for  the  first  sub-period,  confirming  that  smaller  plants  have  on  average 
lower productivity levels than medium-sized plants. The coefficient on the large size 
dummy is not significantly different from zero. This result possibly reflects the fact that 
the  remaining  included  variables  already  capture  the  most  salient  features  of  larger 
plants of relevance to productivity, for example, their degree of foreign exposure. The 
change of regime dummy variable is positive and significant as expected, indicating that 
market liberalization during the 1990s contributes to higher manufacturing productivity 
levels. 
 
                                                 
25 For this period, the Wald test rejects the hypothesis that coefficients across plant sizes are equal. F-
statistic = 2.61, Pr(F > F(2, 40626)) = 0.07.  
26 The semi-logarithmic specification of the regression model implies that the elasticity of productivity 
(exp(￿)) with respect to tariff rates equals ￿1k*tariff rate. 
27 1994-99 (1): F-statistic = 0.48, Pr(F > F(2, 19065)) = 0.62; 1994-99 (2): F-statistic = 0.41, Pr(F > F(2, 
19062)) = 0.67. 26 
Turning to the effect of tax policy changes, the coefficient on the difference between 
nominal and effectively paid tax rates is negative and significant for all firm sizes, and 
not  statistically  different  across  sizes.
28  This  result  confirms  that  the  special  tax 
treatments put in place since 1993 have not enhanced productivity. One reason for this 
result may be that they apply to sectors that, while not particularly efficient, are large 
and powerful enough to exert the necessary lobbying pressure to divert preferential tax 
treatments in their direction.  
 
In the estimation, we do not explicitly instrument for the tariff and tax rate variables. At 
the sector-level, policy measures may be endogenous to productivity measures if less 
efficient producers have high lobbying powers. To the extent that lobbying takes place, 
it  is  likely  to  be  more  prevalent  among  large  sectors  with  strong  organizations  and 
political clout. This moderates the endogeneity concern since the average plant does 
not generally have the ability to enforce sector-level policy changes. The inclusion of 
plant-level fixed effects further helps mitigating possible endogeneity of this sort. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
Despite limitations in the available data, this paper provides a set of interesting results 
on productivity dynamics of the Colombian manufacturing sector. Our findings indicate 
that the economic slowdown of the second half of the 1990s has eroded productivity 
gains from opening the economy to foreign markets in the  early 1990s,  with overall 
manufacturing productivity in 1999 falling below the levels of two decades ago. This is 
caused, in particular, by a decline in within-plant productivity, likely due to a slow-down 
in  technological  progress.  The  decade  associated  with  trade  liberalization,  1985-95, 
sees productivity improvements due to both output reallocation towards more productive 
plants  and  positive  net  entry  effects  relative  to  the  manufacturing  sector’s  earlier 
performance. Both types of productivity gains have been partially reversed by 1999. 
 
                                                 
28 F-statistic = 0.36 and Pr(F > F(2,19062)) = 0.70.  27 
A  breakdown  of  productivity  levels  by  two-digit  ISIC  industry  reveals  significant 
differences in productivity dynamics across manufacturing industries. The only sector 
that displays sustained productivity growth relative to 1977 is the Glass sector, while the 
Textiles,  Machinery  and  Basic  Metals  sectors  experience  only  slight,  but  volatile 
productivity improvements during 1977-99. A productivity decline in some of the largest 
manufacturing sectors, including Chemicals, Food Processing, Paper, and Machinery, 
explains the drop in productivity at the aggregate level. These sectors are also the ones 
for whom the within-plant decrease in productivity is the most pronounced. For sectors 
that gain in productivity over the sample, such as the Glass and Textiles sectors, output 
reallocation over time towards more productive plants is central to productivity growth. 
 
The paper then investigates the role of industrial policy, both as it relates to international 
trade  and  taxation,  in  affecting  plant  behavior  by  relating  the  estimated  plant-level 
productivity to measures  of preferential policy treatments.  Our  econometric analyses 
indicate that effective tariff rates are consistently negatively related to productivity, with 
significantly  stronger  impacts  in  the  post-liberalization  period.  In  light  of  the  overall 
trends in productivity, the results underline that international exposure is only one of the 
factors that influence  plants’ productivity  and that the positive effects of trade  policy 
reforms have not been sufficiently large to date to counteract the overall stagnation in 
productivity  levels.  Similarly,  we  find  that  targeted  tax  exemptions  do  not  enhance 
industry productivity over the sample period, suggesting that to the extent that they have 
been  implemented  to  support  the  development  and  growth  of  specific  sectors,  their 
success is limited. 28 
VII.  Appendix A 
Construction of Plant-Level Data Set 
 
The initial data set contains 166,936 plant-year observations. For a plant to be included 
in the final database used in the empirical analysis, it has to satisfy the following criteria: 
 
§  Only plants with two or more observations during the period 1977-1999 remain in 
the database. The estimation methodology requires multiple annual observations 
per plant. Consequently, we drop 4,020 observations that correspond to plants 
that appear only once throughout the sample period. 
 
§  When a plant reports a sector change from a three-digit ISIC industry to another, 
this change is treated as the liquidation of the plant and the entry of a new plant. 
There are 1,481 3-digit sector changes. 
 
§  When there is a gap of one year during which a plant does not participate in the 
survey, the information for the missing year is obtained by linear interpolation. 
This applies to 3,570 cases. When the reporting gap is longer, as is the case for 
1,777 observations, the plant’s entire history is dropped from the database.  
 
§  The official DANE database consists of the universe of Colombian plants with a 
workforce in excess of 10 employees. To more accurately capture plant entry 
and exit by small plants around the 10-employee cut-off, the following procedure 
is adopted. We use data only for those plants that report an employment level at 
or above 15 employees in at least one of two consecutive years. By dropping 
plants with consistently between 10 and 15 employees, we eliminate the most 
likely plants that could shrink in employment below the 10-employee cutoff from 
one year to the next, but not actually exit the industry altogether. A firm with 15 
employees or more that disappears from the database is thus treated as having 
exited under the assumption that it is unlikely for the plant to lose in excess of 
40% of its workforce over a one-year period. We drop 37,493 plant-observations 
for which reported employment is less than 15 employees in consecutive years. 
This procedure generates 2,303 new instances in which a plant appears in only 
one year. These plants are dropped from the dataset. 
 
§  We drop  2,663  observations corresponding to  501  plants  because of  missing 
data. We furthermore exclude 5,274 observations, or 589 plants, from the final 
database  because  either  their  intermediate  input  usage  or  their  energy 
consumption is less than or equal to zero. 
 
§  All  monetary  series  measured  in  current  Colombian  Peso  are  converted  to 
constant,  1999  Colombian  Peso.  To  deflate  the  capital  series,  we  use  the 
Producer Price Index (PPI) for the formation of capital goods. For intermediate 
inputs, we employ the Producer Price Index for intermediate consumption. To 
deflate the personnel and other operational expenditures, we use the Consumer 
Price  Index.  Last,  the  industrial  output  series  is  deflated  using  a  sector-level 29 
deflator constructed from the sector-level PPI for the period 1990-1999 and the 
industry-wide PPI for the initial years from 1977 to 1989. All price indices are 
obtained from the Central Bank of Colombia. 
 
§  For internal consistency  over  time,  we  subtract  inflation  adjustments  from the 













Plants,           
(t-1) to (t)
Exiting 
Plants,         
(t) to (t+1)
Continuing 
Plants,            
(t-1) to (t)
3,371         3,371         -             -            
3,763         392            334            3,037        
3,796         367            436            2,993        
3,743         383            353            3,007        
3,733         343            372            3,018        
3,754         393            356            3,005        
3,799         401            351            3,047        
3,790         342            345            3,103        
3,831         386            265            3,180        
4,027         461            262            3,304        
4,177         412            299            3,466        
4,287         409            328            3,550        
4,352         393            272            3,687        
4,329         249            373            3,707        
4,209         253            482            3,474        
4,907         1,180         264            3,463        
5,020         377            454            4,189        
4,951         385            461            4,105        
4,993         503            447            4,043        
4,977         431            457            4,089        
4,910         390            535            3,985        
4,638         263            649            3,726        
3,989         -             3,989         -            
Notes: 
(1) Plants remain in the database only if they appear for a minimum of two
years, resulting in zero entering plants between 1998 and 1999 and zero
exiting plants between 1977 and 1978.
(2) Entering plants denote plants that appear for the first time in the respective
 year's Census, similarly, exiting plants denote plants that appear for the last 
time in the respective year's Census.
Break-down of Manufacturing Sector into Entering,























































11.63 2.82 2.97 5.26 56.33 8.88 2.21 2.32 4.76 48.83
9.75 2.52 2.67 4.44 60.14 11.49 3.32 3.53 5.84 60.45
10.09 3.47 3.70 4.91 75.43 9.43 2.74 2.92 5.32 54.92
9.16 3.20 3.38 5.65 59.92 9.97 2.25 2.38 4.38 54.28
10.53 2.33 2.44 4.44 55.02 9.48 2.13 2.23 4.66 47.80
10.68 2.44 2.55 4.76 53.65 9.24 2.04 2.14 4.58 46.65
9.00 1.72 1.79 4.11 43.67 9.10 2.39 2.49 4.38 56.86
10.18 2.31 2.41 4.07 59.28 6.92 2.18 2.29 3.30 69.20
12.03 2.29 2.39 4.61 51.77 6.51 1.88 1.96 3.47 56.56
10.23 1.74 1.81 4.17 43.51 7.16 2.20 2.29 3.50 65.59
9.79 2.80 2.92 4.55 64.19 7.65 1.25 1.30 3.53 36.88
9.17 1.74 1.80 3.63 49.49 6.25 1.21 1.25 2.74 45.64
5.72 1.28 1.32 2.25 58.62 8.62 1.91 1.97 3.89 50.70
5.84 2.60 2.86 3.60 79.44 11.45 6.38 7.00 9.43 74.29
28.04 11.65 13.53 17.21 78.66 5.38 2.26 2.62 4.32 60.74
7.68 2.18 2.29 3.51 65.23 9.04 2.64 2.78 4.60 60.32
7.67 3.37 3.62 4.10 88.31 9.31 3.41 3.66 5.30 69.09
10.16 4.45 4.79 6.26 76.42 8.95 2.64 2.84 4.97 57.17
8.63 3.54 3.76 4.68 80.46 9.18 2.28 2.42 4.62 52.43
7.84 3.66 3.93 5.02 78.25 10.90 2.99 3.20 4.77 67.12
5.36 1.87 1.98 2.86 69.14 13.99 3.78 4.01 5.81 68.97
Notes:
(1) Plant entry denotes plants that enter between the prior year (t-1) and the current year (t), while plant exit occurs between the current year (t) and the following  year (t+1).
(2) Output is measured as the plant’s real value of production in millions of peso and real labor productivity is measured as the plant's real value of production divided by total
employment.
Entry and Exit in the Colombian Manufacturing Sector










































Average 121.09 157.52 78.43 52.55 95.37 130.05 91.48 127.23 206.36 88.13 103.10
Median 49.00 51.00 37.00 32.00 38.00 56.00 43.00 46.00 51.00 40.00 42.00
Std. Dev. 212.07 384.23 147.50 80.20 193.37 191.84 156.33 202.54 619.87 149.21 208.90
Capital Stock (000000, 1999 peso)
Average 3,390.08   2,739.91   359.35   602.06   2,981.92   3,934.77   2,009.89   5,120.27   11,431.12   1,079.65   2,294.78
Median 355.73   241.22   66.43   84.48   255.32   431.58   326.44   338.30   381.01   174.09   195.15
Std. Dev. 18,211.54   16,114.80   1,928.93   4,095.20   16,437.19   17,366.42   8,243.52   23,491.65   53,678.24   4,857.06   14,685.04
                                         
Energy Consumption (000 kw)                                        
Average 1,424.08   1,869.25   167.31   270.16   2,110.96   2,660.47   1,217.97   4,416.36   17,075.58   448.87   1,478.33
Median 290.76   168.88   38.40   56.60   73.06   176.27   309.61   223.22   383.60   84.76   106.16
Std. Dev. 4,150.86   8,222.57   688.41   1,520.56   12,820.75   11,704.85   3,289.83   14,863.31   68,749.31   1,325.57   10,808.51
                                         
Material Inputs (000000, 1999 peso)                                        
Average 6,514.27   2,899.89   933.67   588.78   3,003.81   6,549.95   2,594.79   1,850.48   7,104.68   2,560.91   3,380.13
Median 1,551.17   584.39   272.78   200.73   386.76   1,165.82   655.53   309.49   923.76   368.79   482.27
Std. Dev. 13,435.22   9,796.84   3,017.77   2,154.64   9,438.14   17,964.45   7,061.79   4,118.50   13,413.69   17,869.79   13,443.96
                                         
Output (000000, 1999 peso)                                        
Average 13,832.02   6,602.09   1,694.66   1,480.62   6,848.91   15,501.10   5,342.11   9,177.78   13,968.06   4,318.41   7,287.76
Median 3,108.89   1,194.27   505.41   501.42   1,036.79   3,181.49   1,319.01   1,351.61   1,543.88   782.53   1,075.30
Std. Dev. 30,415.91   24,945.34   5,038.83   5,704.59   20,288.69   37,690.94   16,895.41   21,436.61   30,904.42   23,563.10   24,849.04
Sector Size
Number of Plants 828 830 198 206 317 302 270 222 60 884 4,118
Notes:
(1) All entries represent input and output measures, as well as sector size measures, that have been averaged over the period of the sample, 1977-1999.
Variable




Variable L-P OLS FE  Share L-P OLS FE  Share L-P OLS FE  Share
Labor 0.231 0.236 0.238 0.095 0.243 0.295 0.202 0.084 0.405 0.247 0.241 0.165
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.091) (0.079) (0.084)
Energy 0.053 0.068 0.078 0.013 0.064 0.147 0.080 0.012 0.370 0.292 0.194 0.008
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.053) (0.045) (0.070)
Materials 0.621 0.695 0.549 0.745 0.648 0.543 0.616 0.781 0.387 0.361 0.261 0.634
  (0.039) (0.003) (0.004) (0.203) (0.006) (0.008) (0.080) (0.046) (0.047)
Capital 0.049 0.060 0.059 0.147 0.119 0.098 0.024 0.123 0.022 0.155 -0.018 0.194
  (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.091) (0.009) (0.006) (0.063) (0.038) (0.043)
Dummy - -0.230 -0.137 - -0.152 -0.001 - -0.586 -0.066
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.019) (0.012) (0.115) (0.113)
Obs. 13472 2851 222
Labor 0.260 0.322 0.303 0.176 0.346 0.451 0.372 0.248 0.280 0.328 0.244 0.161
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023)
Energy 0.065 0.091 0.090 0.030 0.069 0.103 0.085 0.011 0.030 0.036 0.093 0.014
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)
Materials 0.548 0.555 0.496 0.489 0.456 0.482 0.410 0.595 0.630 0.629 0.593 0.709
  (0.067) (0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.003) (0.004) (0.149) (0.010) (0.012)
Capital 0.054 0.065 0.062 0.305 0.059 0.046 0.062 0.146 0.059 0.054 0.086 0.115
  (0.033) (0.004) (0.004) (0.030) (0.003) (0.004) (0.054) (0.008) (0.010)
Dummy - 0.036 0.060 - 0.102 0.054 - 0.040 -0.036
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.023)
Obs. 6919 12248 1466
Labor 0.305 0.365 0.292 0.226 0.323 0.351 0.335 0.289 0.226 0.234 0.233 0.126
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Energy 0.041 0.056 0.050 0.013 0.040 0.047 0.080 0.020 0.076 0.077 0.081 0.033
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Materials 0.529 0.602 0.576 0.593 0.560 0.594 0.568 0.472 0.486 0.687 0.615 0.594
  (0.053) (0.007) (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.011) (0.183) (0.006) (0.008)
Capital 0.040 0.041 0.057 0.168 0.072 0.049 0.064 0.219 0.055 0.073 0.044 0.247
  (0.030) (0.004) (0.006) (0.040) (0.005) (0.007) (0.061) (0.006) (0.005)
Dummy - -0.016 -0.020 - 0.048 0.057 - -0.051 0.034
  (0.01) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Obs. 3079 2682 2504
Labor 0.431 0.445 0.383 0.216 0.182 0.164 0.259 0.139 0.311 0.300 0.283 0.172
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Energy 0.046 0.053 0.060 0.012 0.088 0.109 0.223 0.036 0.043 0.033 0.031 0.008
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Materials 0.510 0.522 0.451 0.459 0.407 0.546 0.341 0.607 0.660 0.657 0.610 0.667
  (0.095) (0.006) (0.007) (0.128) (0.008) (0.014) (0.047) (0.006) (0.008)
Capital 0.080 0.088 0.047 0.314 0.276 0.197 0.046 0.218 0.067 0.102 0.068 0.154
  (0.038) (0.005) (0.005) (0.048) (0.009) (0.010) (0.043) (0.005) (0.005)
Dummy - -0.083 0.010 - -0.113 0.227 - -0.187 -0.102
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011)
Obs. 4817 2218 4739





342 351 352  34 
Table 4 (continued) 
 
Labor 0.369 0.243 0.215 0.054 0.196 0.245 0.218 0.131 0.428 0.462 0.447 0.292
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.041) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.026) (0.029) (0.043)
Energy 0.011 0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.035 0.062 0.103 0.033 0.136 0.109 0.170 0.045
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020)
Materials 0.847 0.784 0.534 0.805 0.622 0.641 0.611 0.575 0.458 0.471 0.295 0.299
  (0.111) (0.015) (0.027) (0.059) (0.005) (0.006) (0.112) (0.022) (0.023)
Capital 0.011 0.103 0.055 0.135 0.078 0.087 0.057 0.260 0.126 0.101 0.091 0.364
  (0.082) (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) (0.004) (0.005) (0.129) (0.016) (0.016)
Dummy - -0.139 0.021 - 0.183 0.206 - 0.009 0.039
  (0.038) (0.037) (0.008) (0.010) (0.039) (0.035)
Obs. 430 4922 391
Labor 0.414 0.412 0.448 0.151 0.210 0.225 0.193 0.135 0.222 0.280 0.312 0.151
  (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.031) (0.026) (0.037) (0.044)
Energy 0.194 0.219 0.176 0.057 0.044 0.105 0.084 0.047 0.011 0.184 0.108 0.032
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.019) (0.014) (0.021) (0.024)
Materials 0.351 0.392 0.300 0.249 0.618 0.614 0.584 0.323 0.384 0.359 0.419 0.641
  (0.155) (0.005) (0.009) (0.335) (0.009) (0.020) (0.160) (0.016) (0.018)
Capital 0.074 0.091 0.031 0.544 0.145 0.115 0.030 0.495 0.205 0.160 0.078 0.175
  (0.066) (0.007) (0.007) (0.113) (0.010) (0.014) (0.082) (0.020) (0.019)
Dummy - -0.132 -0.040 - 0.177 0.303 - 0.260 0.307
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.027) (0.032) (0.045) (0.040)
Obs. 3755 888 497
Labor 0.270 0.302 0.280 0.201 0.295 0.332 0.287 0.205 0.257 0.287 0.311 0.120
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Energy 0.056 0.078 0.063 0.021 0.043 0.056 0.073 0.019 0.071 0.079 0.079 0.007
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Materials 0.573 0.606 0.543 0.564 0.386 0.600 0.539 0.601 0.664 0.595 0.534 0.727
  (0.050) (0.004) (0.006) (0.267) (0.006) (0.008) (0.068) (0.006) (0.008)
Capital 0.020 0.079 0.059 0.214 0.051 0.058 0.045 0.175 0.043 0.099 0.054 0.146
  (0.054) (0.004) (0.004) (0.052) (0.005) (0.006) (0.052) (0.006) (0.006)
Dummy - 0.100 0.134 - 0.158 0.186 - 0.061 0.136
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)




Results from Alternative Production Function Estimation Methods (standard errors in parentheses)  35 
Table 5 
 











1977 1.000 0.808 0.714 0.485 1.000
1978 1.039 0.838 0.728 0.563 1.068
1979 1.006 0.831 0.716 0.654 1.023
1980 0.915 0.791 0.687 0.622 0.950
1981 0.891 0.772 0.665 0.606 0.933
1982 0.890 0.754 0.651 0.534 0.929
1983 0.888 0.763 0.656 0.619 1.001
1984 0.902 0.757 0.668 0.482 1.088
1985 0.943 0.768 0.679 0.496 1.473
1986 0.973 0.765 0.680 0.479 1.924
1987 0.943 0.780 0.687 0.550 1.519
1988 1.091 0.779 0.666 0.712 1.644
1989 1.041 0.757 0.667 0.439 1.693
1990 1.057 0.748 0.655 0.542 1.765
1991 0.960 0.756 0.657 0.593 1.783
1992 0.917 0.724 0.639 0.685 1.421
1993 0.889 0.695 0.617 0.506 1.497
1994 0.938 0.726 0.633 0.481 1.659
1995 0.986 0.747 0.661 0.423 1.823
1996 0.996 0.741 0.667 0.442 1.978
1997 1.012 0.767 0.684 0.411 2.239
1998 0.971 0.755 0.687 0.371 2.107
1999 0.947 0.750 0.676 0.487 1.976
Note:
Output-weighted total factor- and real labor productivity are normalized to one in the base year, 1977, for
comparison purposes. They represent output-weighted averages across sectors.
Total Factor Productivity
Descriptive Statistics, Manufacturing Sector Total Factor and Labor Productivity 36 
Figure 1 

















































































































































































































































































































































































Manufacturing 1977 - 1984 -1.339 -2.500 -1.846 3.260 -0.308 -0.054 -1.085 -0.253
1985 - 1995 1.593 -0.719 -1.218 3.449 0.163 0.083 1.512 0.080
1996 - 1999 -0.333 -1.940 -1.553 3.620 0.123 0.583 0.127 -0.460
0.310 -1.508 -1.478 3.420 0.006 0.130 0.434 -0.124
31 Food Processing 1977 - 1984 -1.633 -2.700 -1.455 2.819 -0.186 0.110 -1.336 -0.296
1985 - 1995 -0.157 -1.204 -0.958 2.340 0.152 0.487 0.178 -0.335
1996 - 1999 -0.599 -0.136 -0.891 2.630 -0.076 2.127 1.603 -2.202
-0.707 -1.485 -1.104 2.545 0.003 0.665 -0.045 -0.662
32 Textiles 1977 - 1984 0.195 -0.117 -0.555 1.286 -0.728 -0.309 0.614 -0.419
1985 - 1995 8.594 0.067 -2.411 10.929 -0.464 -0.474 8.585 0.010
1996 - 1999 -3.716 -3.977 -4.607 3.879 -0.006 -0.996 -4.706 0.990
3.684 -0.727 -2.220 6.579 -0.465 -0.516 3.632 0.051
33 Wood 1977 - 1984 -1.511 -2.973 -2.193 3.979 -0.300 0.024 -1.187 -0.324
1985 - 1995 1.902 1.073 -1.338 2.608 -0.490 -0.049 2.343 -0.441
1996 - 1999 1.320 -1.568 -0.640 3.155 -0.019 -0.392 0.947 0.374
0.710 -0.695 -1.483 3.143 -0.344 -0.088 0.966 -0.256
34 Paper 1977 - 1984 -2.716 -2.150 -1.337 1.608 -0.427 0.409 -1.880 -0.836
1985 - 1995 -0.232 -1.156 -1.154 2.038 -0.045 -0.085 -0.272 0.040
1996 - 1999 2.786 0.723 -0.828 2.781 0.124 0.014 2.676 0.110
-0.474 -1.131 -1.153 2.036 -0.136 0.090 -0.248 -0.226
35 Chemicals 1977 - 1984 -1.429 -2.491 -1.954 3.274 -0.546 -0.288 -1.172 -0.257
1985 - 1995 0.286 -1.002 -0.856 2.000 0.321 0.176 0.142 0.144
1996 - 1999 -0.544 -2.663 -0.668 2.273 0.476 -0.038 -1.058 0.514
-0.411 -1.778 -1.171 2.455 0.073 -0.011 -0.494 0.084
36 Glass 1977 - 1984 3.365 3.271 -1.255 1.926 -0.187 0.391 3.942 -0.577
1985 - 1995 1.213 -0.482 -0.536 1.770 0.531 0.070 0.751 0.462
1996 - 1999 1.270 -1.975 -2.362 5.157 0.902 0.451 0.819 0.451
1.908 0.440 -1.097 2.435 0.370 0.241 1.779 0.129
37 Basic Metals 1977 - 1984 -1.327 -2.803 -1.825 3.195 -0.217 -0.323 -1.432 0.105
1985 - 1995 7.825 2.607 -0.877 4.386 0.739 -0.970 6.116 1.709
1996 - 1999 7.864 1.563 1.820 5.189 -0.528 0.179 8.572 -0.708
4.920 0.696 -0.688 4.153 0.204 -0.555 4.161 0.759
38 Machinery 1977 - 1984 -3.442 -7.724 -5.218 8.735 0.393 -0.372 -4.207 0.765
1985 - 1995 2.327 -0.011 -1.828 3.459 0.521 -0.186 1.620 0.707
1996 - 1999 -1.050 -6.005 -3.249 8.181 -0.071 -0.095 -1.073 0.024
-0.122 -3.555 -3.165 5.996 0.373 -0.229 -0.724 0.601
Notes:
Productivity measures aggregated to the 2-digit sector level omit 3-digit sectors that were excluded from the estimation due to data
problems (313 - Beverages, 353- Petroleum Refineries, 355 - Rubber Products, 362 - Glass, 383 - Electric Machinery, 385 - Professional and
Scientific Equipment).


































311 14.13 18.06 8.24 8.03 -41.70
312 16.69 3.69 10.60 4.64 -36.51
313 34.86 3.27 9.12 5.27 -73.82
314 6.85 1.75 6.14 0.91 -10.28
321 21.46 1.24 9.47 1.47 -55.84
322 9.36 3.55 12.95 2.69 38.35
323 9.04 4.66 8.38 4.50 -7.26
324 19.23 2.39 17.51 2.83 -8.92
331 16.20 4.42 8.52 4.77 -47.42
332 27.66 5.76 16.95 4.67 -38.70
341 6.86 8.83 4.30 4.21 -37.32
342 2.40 1.06 3.70 4.64 54.16
351 11.76 4.78 4.69 4.40 -60.13
352 16.32 4.80 9.61 6.74 -41.14
353 1.75 9.07 5.47 8.97 212.60
354 19.40 5.99 10.48 4.31 -46.00
355 22.25 4.78 16.24 2.51 -27.02
356 40.18 3.16 15.93 8.92 -60.36
361 24.77 5.33 15.61 4.45 -37.00
362 27.48 5.06 12.63 3.05 -54.03
369 20.77 3.80 12.31 2.46 -40.73
371 14.26 3.60 5.82 1.87 -59.18
372 9.64 0.51 3.01 1.77 -68.74
381 31.05 14.30 11.89 4.75 -61.71
382 16.20 5.22 7.80 3.78 -51.84
383 26.77 2.28 9.71 3.79 -63.74
384 25.37 11.87 11.41 5.27 -55.01
385 21.72 1.27 8.20 1.31 -62.24
390 29.04 5.40 18.10 3.97 -37.68
Notes:
Average sector-level import tariff rates are computed as the value of tariffs paid relative to
the value of imports at the 3-digit ISIC level. Source: DANE Colombia.
Average Import Tariff as Percent of Total Value of Imported Goods
by Three-Digit ISIC(2) Manufacturing Sector, 1977-89 and 1990-99 (%)
1977-89 1990-99  39 
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Table 8 
 
Year Legislation Corporate Taxation Foreign Trade
1983 Laws 9 and 14 (1) Tax rate decrease from 20 to 18% for 
firms of limited ownership.
(2) Tax exemption granted to electric 
utilities and education service firms.
(3) Introduction of income tax for trade 
and financial intermediary sectors.
1986 Law 75 (1) Unification of tax rate for all 
associations at 30%.
(2) Introduction of income tax for 
investment and capital funds, mixed 
public and private firms, and other 
public firms.
1990 Law 49 (1) Tax exemption granted to equity 
markets, investment, and capital funds. 
Reduction of non-tariff taxes on 
imports (VAT and import license) from 
a rate of 16.5 to 13%.
(2) Reduction of import tariff rate from 
16.5 to 7%.
(3) Elimination of 861 tariff positions 
eliminated.
1992 Law 6 Tax exemption of value-added tax on 
capital goods.
1995 Law 223 Tax rate increase from 30 to 35%.
1995 Law 218 Tax exemptions granted to new firms 
in agriculture, cattle breeding, mining 
of raw materials excl. oil, 
manufacturing, tourism, or exporters 
from the Páez region.
1996 Law 345 (1) 10-year tax exemption of value-added 
tax on capital goods.
(2) Tax exemption of investment in the 
region of the river Paez.
(3) 10-year tax exemption of import tariff 
duties paid.
1997 Law 383 Tax exemption of re-invested earnings. Limit to value-added tax exemption on 
imported goods for which domestically 
produced substitutes are available.
1998 Law 488 (1) Tax  exemptions of contributions to 
pension funds, foreign debt, and 
investment in fixed assets.
(2) Tax exemptions granted to firms that 
provide public services to homes.
Sources:
Steiner and Soto (1999), Hernández, Ortega, Piraquive, Prada, Ramírez and Soto (2000), and tax legislation.





Tax Rate Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
311 32.86 25.19   5.91 9.09   19.06 70.58   22.57
312 32.86 28.93   3.07 2.08   1.79 86.34   7.62
313 32.86 26.10   8.53 9.81   22.41 70.78   29.00
314 32.86 26.26   6.36 0.00   0.00 79.44   16.57
321 32.86 26.33   5.11 1.96   3.89 78.03   11.54
322 32.86 28.64   3.07 4.69   4.06 82.84   2.52
323 32.86 28.08   3.80 0.39   1.04 84.95   7.74
324 32.86 28.27   4.46 2.41   2.91 83.56   7.67
331 32.86 30.42   3.00 4.08   6.56 88.83   8.25
332 32.86 30.79   3.05 0.49   0.40 93.13   1.80
341 32.86 25.04   4.90 2.25   3.18 74.55   14.34
342 32.86 27.73   3.41 44.29   7.30 46.68   4.64
351 32.86 26.17   4.07 2.17   3.21 78.26   12.85
352 32.86 29.50   3.20 2.26   3.30 87.92   8.74
353 32.86 29.09   3.54 1.73   3.21 87.11   9.31
354 32.86 28.51   2.67 1.73   3.21 85.46   7.61
355 32.86 28.24   3.91 1.58   1.74 84.34   7.27
356 32.86 25.44   1.94 3.30   4.97 74.98   5.54
361 32.86 23.21   2.78 2.77   3.07 69.43   12.58
362 32.86 18.48   9.45 0.05   0.07 57.92   31.41
369 32.86 26.42   3.31 8.13   9.63 73.79   10.30
371 32.86 26.98   3.01 1.72   1.95 80.93   8.81
372 32.86 27.84   3.31 7.26   9.73 78.41   9.98
381 32.86 28.68   3.04 1.57   2.90 85.96   7.30
382 32.86 28.46   4.87 2.07   3.43 84.93   13.85
383 32.86 28.75   2.50 1.30   2.06 86.69   8.16
384 32.86 30.42   3.16 3.01   8.23 90.09   12.00
385 32.86 28.95   5.36 5.59   14.18 82.69   17.21
390 32.86 30.51   3.21 2.37   5.85 90.63   8.52
Notes:
Average effective tax rates by sector represent nominal tax rates adjusted for deductions, while the tax exemption
rate denotes the total amount of exemptions measured in Peso as a share of the taxable base. Source: Colombian
Ministry of Finance.
Average Tax Rates and Tax Exemptions by Sector,
by Three-Digit ISIC(2) Manufacturing Sector, 1993-99 (%)
Effective Tax Rate Tax Exemption Rate










2-digit Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
31 16,2% 21,2% 17,5% 31,2% 25,2% 19,1% 14,4%
32 18,5% 12,9% 7,3% 5,2% 8,2% 8,5% 10,8%
33 6,0% 1,5% 0,6% 0,4% 0,3% 0,2% 0,2%
34 27,2% 28,5% 19,9% 13,8% 21,8% 25,3% 28,5%
35 11,8% 10,6% 40,4% 35,8% 14,8% 13,9% 14,3%
36 6,0% 14,5% 7,1% 7,1% 16,0% 7,8% 4,3%
37 1,9% 2,2% 0,9% 0,6% 1,0% 0,4% 0,5%
38 10,1% 6,5% 5,1% 4,7% 9,9% 14,5% 11,7%
39 2,4% 2,1% 1,2% 1,2% 2,7% 10,4% 15,2%
Total Exemptions 
($000000) 285.432 310.878 556.075 723.297 470.997 384.416 259.484
Average Exchange 
Rate PESO/$ 788,69 827,33 919,50 1037,72 1154,10 1433,47 1770,30
Source: Colombian Ministry of Finance











3.95*** 4.04*** 3.94*** 3.92***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.038) (0.030)
0.09* -0.02 -0.38* -0.39*
(0.053) (0.056) (0.230) (0.022)
-0.12*** -0.15*** -0.55*** -0.53***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.191) (0.183)
-0.09** -0.11*** -0.57*** -0.57***
(0.039) (0.034) (0.195) (0.191)
0.45*** 0.37*** -0.24*** -0.21***
(0.071) (0.106) (0.075) (0.073)
0.45*** 0.37*** -0.21*** -0.18***
(0.069) (0.107) (0.065) (0.063)
0.42*** 0.34*** -0.22*** -0.19***
(0.066) (0.105) (0.068) (0.066)
0.23*** 0.12*** 0.34*** 0.35***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.089) (0.090)
-0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02* -0.02
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00









No. Obs 77,816 48,746 24,741 24,741






Standard errors are robust standard errors that correct for the clustered nature of the data at the 4-digit ISIC
level.
* denotes significance at the 10% level, **  at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Panel Analysis
(standard errors in parentheses)
Lagged Real Devaluation Rate 
* Medium Size Dummy
Lagged Effective Tax 
Benefit*Large Size Dummy
Lagged Real Devaluation 
Rate*Large Size Dummy
Lagged Tariff Rate * Medium 
Size Dummy




Lagged Effective Tax Benefit * 
Small Size Dummy
Lagged Effective Tax Benefit * 
Medium Size Dummy
Constant




Lagged Real Devaluation Rate 
* Small Size Dummy
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